Pulling the Curtain down: An Introduction
to the Role of the East German Protestant Church in the Peaceful Revolution of
1989
The
year 1989 will always be remembered as the year in which a hurricane of democratic
change swept across the Communist-dominated political landscape of Eastern
Europe. Several political and religious groups, long oppressed and pushed to
the periphery of society in these countries, found after the fall of old
governments and the confused scramble to establish new ones, that they suddenly
had representatives of their interests in important positions of national
leadership. The disenfranchised suddenly transformed into the empowered, in
some cases in only a matter of a few months.
The
East German Protestant Church, represented especially by the Evangelische
Kirche - the East German Lutheran Church - provides an excellent example of
an unlikey political actor in a Communist state. Its churches across the
country generated an incredible amount of political change before the collapse
of the East German government in November 1989, led by Erich Honnecker. One
certainly oversimplifies the Revolution to conclude that the overwhelming
activism of the Church was the only factor determining the historical changes.
To assert such, in fact, would be to apply a reductionist logic similar to that
of the Marxist dialectical materialism against which the masses revolted. But
definitely, the mass engagement of East German citizens with strong connections
to the church helped assure the success and peaceful nature of the Revolution.
One can safely say that the East German Protestant Church was at the forefront
of the Revolution, initiating and propelling many of the historical political
changes that collectively known as the "Friedliche Revolution"
or Peaceful Revolution of 1989.
The
central role of church leaders and members is evident in their political
engagement before and during the Revolution in
1. conducting
dialogue between citizens and government leaders;
2. in
organizing mass protests;
3. and
in providing a safe meeting place for diverse activist groups, which united
some of the most vocal dissenting elements in society that challenged the
government's authority.
East German Christians were also politically engaged after the Revolution (or
"the turning" as they call it) in mediating and establishing a forum
to debate the future shape of society and the government after the sudden end
of 40 years of Communist rule. Several church leaders also held important
positions in the new coalition government that followed the Revolution. This
paper examines the contributions and direction which the Church gave to the
political changes and attempts to offer some basic explanations for why and how
the Church became such a critical agent of change in this, the only peaceful
revolution in Germany's history.
In
order to understand the dissent that led masses of East Germans to unite in
scores of anti-government protests (which of course were illegal), one must
first understand the totalitarian nature of life under the SED party, the
Socialist Unity Party. Perhaps the country's official name, the German
Democratic Republic, was somewhat of a misnomer. Some have joked that the
Communist takeover after World War II rendered the GDR barely German, hardly
democratic, and certainly not a Republic. During the nation’s 40-year history,
the Socialist Unity Party established and enforced the "total touch"
policy characteristic of totalitarian regimes. Each sector of society was subdued
under the careful guidance of the only official party, the SED.
Nielsen
points out that with no legal opposition parties, the Communist party, the SED,
established and enforced the "most efficient police state in Europe"
(Nielsen, p. 25). The Secret Police (or the Stasi, as they were most
un-affectionately known) were famous for both their skilfulness and their
ruthlessness. They oversaw a massive enforcement apparatus, well known for
keeping rooms of files detailing the personal histories, and in many oases, the
daily activities of citizens, commoners and leaders alike. One never knew if
the neighbour next-door or across the street was a paid informant of the Stasi,
on salary to report any so-called anti-government activities. The Stasi also
bugged and monitored telephones with stereotypical German efficiency (Nielsen,
p. 25).
In
his excellent comparative account of the revolutions in Eastern Europe, Niels
Nielsen describes the conditions against which the East Germans rebelled. He
notes that there were little or no open discussions of important societal
issues, public demonstration was illegal, and travel outside the GDR was
generally prohibited, unless one vacationed in other Eastern Bloc countries.
Some exemptions were possible, and the government liberalized these policies in
the last few years (along with emigration policy) in the face of growing unrest
(Nielsen, p.25). Strict Marxist-Leninist philosophy was also enforced in the
workplace and in schools at all levels. As "the only true worldview",
citizens had to swear their loyalty to Marxist-Leninist ideals, or the
government denied them and their children educational and employment
opportunities (Pierard, p.501).
Citizens
wearied however, of this "total touch," and in many cases rejected this
enforced worldview as ideologically bankrupt (Nielsen, p. 42). They demanded a
radical restructuring of society, freedom of expression and travel, elections
that were not rigged, and an end to personal harassment (Nielsen, p. 42,45).
Nielsen explains that this groundswell of dissent in the 1980's coincides also
with East Germany's prolonged economic decline. The government’s inability to
improve the citizens' standard of living helped convince the people, he
concludes, that East Germany, under Erich Honnecker's leadership, was both
ideologically and economically bankrupt (Nielsen, p. 45).
On
October 9th, considered by many commentators the turning point of the
Revolution, West German President Richard von Weiszäcker was asked how he
explained the unprecedented upheaval in East Germany. He replied,
"Gorbachev and the churches" (Nielsen, p.27). It seems that
Gorbachev's glasnost was indeed coming to East Germany, even though the SED
leadership condemned the reforms and determined at first not to follow Moscow's
lead and liberalize its policies (Burgess, p. 31). Without Gorbachev's decision
to allow the protests, one might speculate that the Peaceful Revolution might
have had a very un-peaceful ending. If, for example, he had decided to enforce
the Brezhnev doctrine and maintain Soviet control of the GDR by force, as was
done in 1953, there may have never been a successful Revolution. One should not
underestimate the fortune (or as some East Germans suggest - the providence) of
the simultaneous unrest in the Soviet Union that influenced Gorbachev not to
entangle himself in East German domestic affairs. The moment seemed primed for
change, and the Church, as Weiszäcker suggests, took full advantage of this
historic opportunity.
In
at least five ways, members of Protestant churches across the country, most
notably in Leipzig and Berlin, but also in smaller rural locales, became
engaged in political activity at the grassroots level. Although the Church has
had a significant political identity for years, it had never before fostered as
much antigovernment protest as its members did in the final years before the
collapse of Communist rule (Burgess. p. 17). In 1989, the Church became a key
agent behind the mass mobilization of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of
citizens, all demanding change. An examination of the Church's leadership role
in the protests also indicates that its members consistently emphasized the
need for peaceful protests by all citizens and the necessity of restraining
from the use of violence.
Pierard,
a historian at Indiana State University, explains that tensions between
hard-line leaders and reformers in government steadily grew throughout 1987 and
1988 (Pierard, p.502). However, during the summer of 1989 two events triggered
action: the rigged local elections of May 7th and the dismantling of the
354-kilometre long iron fence border between Austria and Hungary (Pierard, p.
502). In Leipzig, the Stasi arrested more than 100 demonstrators who protested
against the undemocratic election. This prompted church leadership at a
conference in June to break decisively with any remaining
"accomodationist" sentiment and to condemn the falsified election as
evidence of the government's undemocratic orientation (Pierard, p. 502).
Meanwhile,
in July and August, thousands of vacationing East Germans began pouring through
the newly opened border in Hungary. Exercising again its activist voice in its
official pronouncements, the Church drafted a letter to Honnecker "calling
for an open discussion of the problems facing the country, respect for
dissenting opinions, and an immediate end to press censorship and travel
restrictions" (Pierard, p. 502). Again, on September 19th, the synod of
the Federation of Protestant Churches sent an even stronger statement
justifying the mass exodus of citizens and urging immediate democratic reforms.
The
development of special interest activist groups within local congregations is
the second indication of its significant political involvement. The base groups
were collections of individuals with a variety of social concerns who met to
plan events and exchange ideas regarding peace and disarmament issues, human
rights, preservation of the environment, and several other concerns (Nielsen,
p. 37). They served as a broad umbrella to bring Christians and other activists
together into the grassroots organizations that later served as the core of
dissent during the Revolution. The church sheltered and defended these groups,
who were prohibited from meeting openly. They enjoyed relative safety inside
the church walls, although the danger always remained that government
informants could also infiltrate the church. John Burgess describes the unique
“free space” that these groups provided for activists in contrast to the state-imposed
conformity they experienced elsewhere. “The church offered a sense of freedom and
acceptance,” he explains, “that they did not find elsewhere in
society” Burgess, p.24). The agenda of these
groups influenced the Synod’s approach to social issues and helped keep the
Church attentive to the political interests of East Germans at the local level
(Pierard, p.502). The Church served as the key meeting place for dissenters
during the Revolution and fostered the development of core activist groups.
Members of these close-knit pockets of political dissent became instrumental as
leaders during the weeks of mass protest.
New
illegal political parties, such as Democracy Now and the New Democratic
Departure also sprang up in 1989. The initial meetings of both were held in
churches in Berlin and Leipzig. This third reflection of the Church’s
involvement is most apparent when one examines the results of the first free
election after the Revolution. On March 18, 1990 the Christian Democratic Union
party won an overwhelming number of parliament seats, soundly defeating the
former Communist party which had sought a facelift in its much—needed name
change to the Party of Democratic Socialism. The significant point is not that
the CDU won, but rather that out of 400 seats, 21 Lutheran pastors, 2
theologians, one Baptist layperson, and three other lay leaders were elected
(Pierard, 507). The voters understood that the Church had led the Revolution in
many respects. It had also maintained the only alternative worldview to Marxist—Leninism
over the years. Prominent Church members even led the new coalition government.
The new Prime Minister, Lothar de Maziere, was a lay member of the presidium of
the Protestant Church Federation. Four Cabinet Ministers were also pastors, including
the Foreign Affairs Minister (Markus Meckel), the Minister for Economic
Cooperation (Hans-Wilhelm Ebeling), the Minister for Media Policy (Gottfried
Müller) and Rainer Eppelmann, the Minister for Disarmament and Defense
(Pierard, p.507). Professing Christians would never have held these positions
before the Revolution, because no one with personal or familial contact with
the church could advance in the Communist hierarchy (Pierard, p. 506). They
would be extremely fortunate, in fact, to have received a college education,
since most traditional educational and professional opportunities were closed
to those who did not officially disassociate themselves from the church
(Pierard, p. 506).
In
addition to their official statements against the SED government, the housing
of the core political groups, and their involvement in the new political
parties, the church members also led the first mass protests in Leipzig. Often
leaders within the church were relied on to lead rallies and organise protests
(Nielsen, p.38). Perhaps the most significant and well-known method by which
the Leipzig churches contributed to the mass mobilization of their city to
protest in October and November was through the “Montagsgebete” or Monday
prayer services. Every Monday since 1982 hundreds of citizens met at the
Nikolaikirche (the Church of St. Nicholas) to pray individually and
collectively for both personal and social concerns (Nielsen, p.25) Eventually
the practice spread to other churches as well. In these meetings, people often
offered prayers for peace and over the years, the weekly gatherings developed a
significant political dimension. Nielsen explains:
Their political engagement for peace and
justice was intrinsic to their preaching. But it was members of the base communities,
not primarily the larger constituency of the churches, which came to make up a
subculture of resistance. Political opposition became especially intense as
church prayer services served as a place of information, a voice for the
voiceless (Nielsen,
p.41.)
The
Monday-night prayer meetings served as a catalyst or rallying-point for the
demonstrators in Leipzig. Hans Taut, a doctor In Leipzig, whose family attended
the demonstrations, explains that the weekly regularity of these meetings
partially accounts for the large numbers that protested during October and
November. During these months of the largest protests, citizens knew
that each Monday, hundreds would fill St. Nicholas Church and
afterward proceed with lit candles through the Leipzig streets to the centre of
town. The reliability of these protesters to lead demonstrations always on the
same evening enabled the thousands and later hundred of thousands of citizens
to have a predetermined time and place to meet for mass demonstrations, whether
they came first to a service in one of several churches or joined the
demonstrators after they arrived in the massive open area near the University
of Leipzig.
Thus,
the largest demonstrations always occurred on Mondays and grew in size as the
summer weeks passed. Reliable estimates of the demonstrators attending the
protests in October reveal a stunning progression: October 2 — 10,000; October
9 — 70,000; October 16 - 120,000; October 30 - 300,000 (Nielsen, p.30). Amidst
this national crisis for the SED party, Erich Honnecker resigned on October
18th and was replaced by Egon Krenz, who remained in office less than two
months.
Leipzig
pastor Hans-Jürgen Sievers details the Church’s involvement in the Revolution
during the months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November. His account
of the Monday prayer meeting on October 9th provides insight into the role of
the Church and the mind of the demonstrator. I offer here a translation of a
passage out of his book Stundenbuch einer deutschen Revolution:
St. Nicholas’ Church had to be evacuated
once again because of another bomb threat. Shortly after 4 P.M. entrance was
forbidden, and only a few minutes later, three other churches were overflowing
with people. For the first time, St. Thomas’ Church and St. Michael’s Church
were involved, both two streetcar stops away from the centre of town. The
situation in the churches was a once in a lifetime experience. People sat,
stood, and pressed themselves into any available spot. They stood on the
staircases up to the balconies, in the doorways, and outside in the streets. A
breathtaking silence and focused alertness dominated the crowds. The crowds
attending the services were filled with both fear and great determination —
determination not to allow themselves to be intimidated, and to go anyway out
on the streets. At the same time, they feared the consequences
(Sievers, p.73).
Meditation
texts used by the Church during these gatherings reveal the political nature of
the Church’s message of resistance. For example, a political adaptation of the
biblical text, I Corinthians Chapter 13, was read on October 9th in the Leipzig
Reformed Church. The meditation, originally written by Canaan Banana, the
former State President of Zimbabwe, and a committed Lutheran, indicates the Church’s
awareness of the larger struggle for the recognition of human rights around the
world. Although the author originally described political oppression in an
African context, members of the East German Church recognised parallels with
their own situation and included the text in its service. The meditation
expresses scepticism towards the present political system, emphasizes the need
to take action, and indicates a deep concern for the protection of human
rights. Portions of the African devotion include:
I would be a hypocrite if I preached about
the sacredness of life and watched the suffering of my people without doing
anything. I would be a hypocrite.
Love never gives up. As precious as life,
are justice and human dignity. Political slogans will pass away, systems of
exploitation will decay. People call for liberation, because God has given us
the right to worth and freedom (Sievers, p.74).
Perhaps
one of the most significant contributions of the Church in its role of
generating and organizing dissent was its consistent appeal to both citizens
and government leaders for non-violent change. Base groups were especially
effective in persuading demonstrators to avoid violent clashes with the police.
Hans Taut explains that citizens feared that the government could order the
police to fire cm the crowds at the demonstrations. Police encircled the
demonstrators enclosing them, and they were always armed. What followed in
Romania months later could conceivably also have occurred in Leipzig. Footage
of the protests discovered at the secret police headquarters shows how
high-powered cameras atop city buildings would focus in narrowly on faces in
the crowds. The Stasi would seek to identify and arrest any leaders of the
protests.
The
possibility also existed that the police could plant agents in civilian clothes
in the crowds to provoke fights. In the event of such a violent outbreak, the
peaceful demonstrators from the Church, most holding candles and posters, were
certain to lose. Given this tense environment, the base groups from the Leipzig
churches made extensive appeals to the crowds before protests, urging
non-violent demonstrations.
Sievers
includes in his account of the events of October 9th the text of an
appeal made by the Leipzig base groups for justice, Human Rights, and
Environmental Protection. The document describes the danger of past
demonstrations, the uselessness of violent solutions, and it offers suggestions
for peaceful protest. These citizen groups write, “We fear for the future of
our country. Violence creates only more violence. Violence solves no problems,
violence is inhuman, violence can not be the sign of a better society”
(Sievers, p.752) The base groups also implore the crowds not to attempt to
break through any human chains which the police form and to restrain themselves
from every form of violence. The conclusion of their statement reveals the
effects of the democratic liberalism that upset the imposed Communist order in
East Germany. Affirming their sovereignty, they write:
We are the people! Violence among us
leaves behind eternally bleeding wounds! Above all, the party and the
government must be held accountable for the rise of the present serious
situation. But today it is our responsibility to prohibit a further escalation
of the violence. On this our future depends
(Sievers, p.76).
Erwin
Weber also points out that during the Montagsgebete, the Monday prayer
services, thousands of people were praying for safe, peaceful demonstrations,
before marching with their lit candles - symbols of their peaceful intent — out
into the streets. He writes, “You have to realize that the demonstrators were
boiling with hate for what the state had inflicted upon them the last forty
years… However, with the candle in their hands, a reminder of ‘Lord, make me an
instrument of your peace,’ the demonstrators were kept from using force and
resorting to violence (Weber, p.8-9). The Church’s insistence on non-violent
protest helps explain why the East German Revolution is known in Germany as the
“friedliche”
or peaceful revolution.
The
preceding discussion has offered an introduction to how the Church became
politically engaged in the Revolution in 1989. One learns even more about the
political culture in the former German Democratic Republic by asking why the
Church, as an institution, became such an important political actor. An
examination of the unique political culture that developed in the East since
1949 is now a particularly significant and worthwhile study for Europeanists,
when one considers the challenges which unification brings to the five new Länder and
to Germany as a whole.
Several
explanations help explain the Church’s strong role in political affairs in
1989. John Burgess, describing the development of church—state affairs in East
Germany, notes that the Church has always maintained a strong political
identity, one that at times has even overshadowed its religious identity
(Burgess, p.172) He suggests, in fact, that the Church “has consistently represented the major
ideological and political alternative to the Communist party and socialist
state” (Burgess, p.17). The Church served as a
voice of the people and developed into what the Nazi-resistor Dietrich
Bonhoeffer called “the church for others” (Nielsen, p.32-33).
The
Church embraced many people who found themselves on the periphery of East
German society. Many writers and artists, long accustomed to censorship, found
openness in the Church and joined the protest community there. Another
contributing factor explaining the leading role of the Church in the events of
1989 is the state of unity the Church sought to maintain. While there was
occasional division between base group members, Nielsen notes that the Church
formed a more consistently unified resistance than other groups such as writers
and artists. He relies on analysis by the East German sociologist and activist
Erhard Neubert, who argues that the strengths and weaknesses of the Revolution
reflects the protesters’ “Protestant heritage” as it was linked to capitalism
(Nielsen, p.40). Neubert suggests (not with derogatory intent) that the artist
groups in the larger East German society “were highly individualistic and divided
amongst themselves” (Nielsen, p. 40). Communists could more
easily disrupt their occasional protests. This lack of concentrated dissent
further opened the way for a vocal, engaged Church to become a key actor.
Furthermore,
as noted before, the Church seemed to offer the only alternative worldview in a
society dominated by atheistic materialism. “Religious leaders, by contrast,”
Nielsen explains, “felt more keenly a living relation to a longer past and tradition”
(Nielsen, p. 40). The people probably identified to some degree with this
heritage which long predated the imposition of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In
fact, a compelling interpretation explaining why churches across Eastern Europe
assumed such significant roles in these anticommunist revolutions points to the
“triple vector” that churches provided against Communist totalitarianism.
Patrick
Michel’s study La sociétée retrouvée politique et reliogion dans l’
Europe sovietsée contends that the engagement of the church and its
reception as a legitimate voice for the people was to be expected (Nielsen,
p.6). In most cases, it was the only institution in these Eastern European
countries that took a stand “against the alienation of individuals, against the totalization of
society and against the sovietization of the nation”
(Nielsen, p.6). Religious conviction challenged the Soviet attempt to suppress
personal freedom and distinct national traditions in the service of creating a
vast, homogeneous Soviet empire. The present strength of national spirit across
Eastern Europe testifies to the difficulty of this task.
Religious
practice in East Germany, however secularised, may have reinforced
nationalistic, anti-soviet feelings among citizens at the grassroots level. In
any case, it is entirely conceivable that the East German Church over the years
supported an alternative subculture that sustained civil society in a
totalitarian environment. The engagement of the Church in the Revolution
reveals that its members contributed moral values, integrity and a concern for
human rights to am East German society founded on scientific dialectical materialism
and dominated by a government which often denied these benefits to its
citizens.
The
Revolutions of 1989 are popularly described as having required ten years of
struggle in Poland, ten weeks in Germany, ten days in Czechoslovakia and ten
hours in Romania (Nielsen, p.6). Although this understates the struggle of
resistors in many of these countries, the observation accurately describes the
quickness of the political change that transformed Europe three years ago. As
several commentators have documented, members of Christian churches -
Protestant and Catholic — became key political actors in these historical
events. In the case of East Germany, the Church conducted dialogue between
citizens and the government, assuming the role of speaking up for the voiceless
in the former Volksrepublik or “People’s Republic.” Church and lay
leaders also organized mass demonstrations, emphasizing the necessity of
non—violent protest and the virtue in following Christ’s example. Churches also
sheltered diverse activist groups, who later led protests, developed, and
articulated the ideological basis of the people’s protests. The Church was the
main institution to provide an alternative worldview to the Marxist ideology
that the Communists preached in the schools, in the workplace and in mandatory
indoctrination sessions. Niels Nielson summarizes the fundamental conflict
between church and state in the former East German society like this:
…it must be said that the stereotype of a
group of steadfast true believers giving unqualified prophetic witness against
a brutal system is all too easily invoked. Such situations existed, and there
were faithful martyrs, but the larger problem was the conflict between religion
and culture, church and state in the Communist setting. Religion is a social
phenomenon, not simply a matter of individual belief. It exists in community.
Even religious communities that were compromised under communism stood apart
from totalitarianism, challenging it. The continued life of the churches in
spite of state control indicated that Marxist atheism had not won fully…
‘Tearing down the curtain’ was not just the work of movements and ideas; it
happened because courageous men and women resisted apathy and fear
(Nielsen. p.9).
Stephen
Lazarus
April
6, 1992
Many to Many Issue 3 February 1993